In a twist that defies logic for many patients, Merck, the pharmaceutical giant behind the blockbuster diabetes drug Januvia (sitagliptin), slashed its price dramatically in early 2025.

Merck Slashed Januvia’s Price—Yet Insurers Dropped It: A Deep Dive into PBMs and the U.S. Drug Pricing Crisis

In a twist that defies logic for many patients, Merck, the pharmaceutical giant behind the blockbuster diabetes drug Januvia (sitagliptin), slashed its price dramatically in early 2025. This move should have been a boon for the millions of Americans managing type 2 diabetes. Instead, it’s turned into a nightmare for many insured patients who are now finding their insurance plans no longer cover the drug. The reason? Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs)—the opaque middlemen of the U.S. healthcare system—have yanked Januvia from their formularies, prioritizing profits over patient access. This development shines a harsh spotlight on the predatory practices of PBMs and the broader dysfunction of America’s drug pricing ecosystem.

What Happened to Januvia’s Cost?

Januvia burst onto the scene in 2006 after receiving approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as a novel treatment for type 2 diabetes. A dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP-4) inhibitor, it quickly became a cornerstone of diabetes management, raking in billions annually for Merck. For years, its wholesale acquisition cost (WAC)—the list price before discounts or rebates—hovered around $600 per month, a figure that shaped steep out-of-pocket costs for the uninsured. However, insured patients often paid far less, thanks to PBM-negotiated rebates that kept Januvia on preferred formularies, translating into low copays.

That changed in January 2025, when Merck slashed Januvia’s WAC by 42%, dropping it to roughly $348 per month. The decision was likely strategic, preempting the impact of Medicare’s drug price negotiation program, set to influence pricing for select drugs starting in 2026 under the Inflation Reduction Act. For a company that had reaped massive profits from Januvia over nearly two decades, this was a notable shift—potentially a signal of adaptability in a changing regulatory landscape.

But rather than celebrating the savings, one of the nation’s largest PBMs, CVS Caremark, responded by removing Januvia from its formulary. Other major PBMs, like Express Scripts and OptumRx, have followed suit in varying degrees, leaving patients in limbo. This counterintuitive reaction underscores a critical flaw in the U.S. healthcare system: the entities tasked with controlling costs often prioritize their own bottom lines over affordability for consumers.

Why Would PBMs Drop a Lower-Priced Drug?

PBMs—intermediaries that manage prescription drug benefits for insurers, employers, and government programs—publicly justify their formulary decisions with claims of balancing clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness. Behind the scenes, however, their business model thrives on a complex web of financial incentives that often clash with patient interests. Here’s how it works:

Rebates & Spread Pricing
PBMs negotiate rebates from drug manufacturers in exchange for favorable formulary placement. These rebates, often a percentage of a drug’s list price, can be substantial—sometimes 30-50% or more. A high list price like Januvia’s original $600 meant hefty rebates for PBMs, a portion of which they might pass on to insurers or employers, while pocketing the rest. When Merck cut Januvia’s price, the rebate pool shrank, reducing PBMs’ profit margins and making the drug less attractive.
Steering Patients to Pricier Alternatives
With Januvia’s lower price diminishing rebate revenue, PBMs have an incentive to favor competing drugs with higher list prices—and thus bigger rebates—even if those alternatives offer no superior clinical benefit. For example, drugs like AstraZeneca’s Onglyza (saxagliptin) or Boehringer Ingelheim’s Tradjenta (linagliptin), both DPP-4 inhibitors, might remain on formularies if their manufacturers maintain higher prices and rebate offers.
Preserving Revenue Streams
The PBM industry, dominated by a handful of giants controlling nearly 80% of the market, relies heavily on rebate-driven income. A widespread shift toward lower list prices threatens this model. As Pearl Freier, president of Cambridge BioPartners Inc., notes, CVS Caremark’s decision to drop Januvia may stem from a rival manufacturer dangling a juicier rebate for a competing drug. “Patients can try to switch to another insurance/formulary that covers Januvia,” she explains, “but whether they can do that may depend on what their employer wants to do.” For many, switching isn’t an option, leaving them at the mercy of PBM diktats.

This isn’t a new critique. PBMs have faced mounting scrutiny, with lawmakers, regulators, and even the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigating their role in inflating drug costs. Yet their influence persists, entrenched by a lack of transparency and their integration into vertically aligned conglomerates (e.g., CVS Health owns Caremark, Cigna owns Express Scripts).

Patient Backlash and the Real-World Fallout

The fallout from Januvia’s formulary exclusion has sparked outrage across social media, where patients are venting their frustration and sharing stories of disrupted care. On X, one user lamented: “Yesterday my insurance decided I don’t need Januvia for my diabetes anymore. I’ve been on it for years, and now it’s going to be $600 a month.” Another, on Bluesky, a type 2 diabetic, wrote: “They denied BOTH the Mounjaro and Januvia. [expletive] hate it here.” A Threads user reported a denied prior authorization for Januvia, while another noted their insurer rejected coverage for both antidepressants and Januvia starting March 31, 2025.

These anecdotes reflect a broader trend. When PBMs exclude drugs, patients face a stark choice: pay cash at full price, switch to a covered alternative (which may not work as well), or fight through bureaucratic appeals. For Januvia, the cash price post-cut is still $348 monthly—a steep burden for those without insurance or discount options. Worse, some fear price hikes ahead of Medicare negotiations. One X user, reacting to Medicare’s announcement of its next 15 drugs for price talks, claimed their Januvia cost had already spiked to $900 for a three-month supply in 2025, anticipating manipulation before negotiated rates kick in.

The anger isn’t abstract. One X user darkly mused that picking up Januvia for a family member evokes thoughts of the late UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson’s fate “for no apparent reason”—a chilling nod to public fury over healthcare profiteering, underscored by Thompson’s real-world assassination in December 2024 amid insurer backlash.

This isn’t just about Januvia. It’s a microcosm of a system where PBMs wield outsized control, often at odds with patient welfare. Pharmaceutical companies like Merck aren’t blameless either—decades of high pricing fueled their profits before this cut—but PBMs amplify the harm by thwarting savings.

How Are Patients Supposed to Afford Januvia Now?

For those caught in this mess, options exist, though they require effort and resources not all possess.

Consider Generics or Alternatives
The FDA approved generic sitagliptin in 2023, with manufacturers like Teva, Aurobindo, and Viatris (Mylan) entering the fray. However, patent settlements and exclusivity deals have delayed widespread availability, and prices remain inconsistent. Patients can use Healthywayrx.com to compare sitagliptin costs and explore other DPP-4 inhibitors or drug classes (e.g., SGLT2 inhibitors like Jardiance) with their doctors.
Check Patient Assistance Programs
Merck offers copayment cards and assistance programs for eligible patients, as do nonprofits like NeedyMeds, RxAssist, HealthWell Foundation, and Patient Access Network Foundation. These can offset costs, but eligibility often hinges on income, insurance status, or other hurdles.
Compare Discounts and International Prices
Find and compare U.S. discount coupons and international mail-order prices, where brand-name Januvia or generics may be cheaper. For instance, Canadian pharmacies often list lower cash prices due to stricter price controls, though importing requires navigating U.S. regulations.

These workarounds help some, but they’re bandaids on a gaping wound. Patients shouldn’t need to scour the internet or jump through hoops to afford a drug their insurer once covered.

Final Thoughts: A Broken System Laid Bare

Merck’s 42% price cut on Januvia, though late after years of blockbuster profits, could have been a rare win for patients in a system notorious for high costs. Instead, PBMs turned it into a case study of perverse incentives. By dropping Januvia, they’ve shown how their rebate-driven model keeps prices artificially inflated, even when manufacturers lower them. This isn’t an isolated incident—it’s a symptom of a healthcare structure where profit trumps access.